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International trade allows to exploit regional differences in climate change impacts and is increasingly 
regarded as a potential adaptation mechanism. Here we focus on hunger reduction through 
international trade under alternative trade scenarios for a wide range of climate futures. Under 
current level of trade integration climate change would lead to up to 55 million people 
undernourished in 2050. Without adaptation through trade, global climate change impacts would 
increase to 73 million additional people undernourished (+33%). Reduction of tariffs, and institutional 
and infrastructural barriers would decrease the negative impact to 20 million (-64%). We assess 
trade’s adaptation effect and climate-induced specialization patterns. The adaptation effect is 
strongest for hunger-affected import-dependent regions. In hunger-affected export-oriented regions, 
however, partial trade integration can lead to increased exports at the expense of domestic food 
availability. While trade integration is a key component of  adaptation, it needs sensitive 





Approximately 11% of the 2017 world population or 821 million people suffered from hunger1. 
Undernourishment is increasing since 2014 due to conflict, climate variability and extremes, and is most 
prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa (23.2% of population), the Caribbean (16.5%) and Southern Asia 
(14.8%)1. Climate change is projected to raise agricultural prices2 and to expose an additional 77 million 
people to hunger risks by 20503, thereby jeopardizing the UN Sustainable Development Goal to end 
global hunger4. Adaptation policies to safeguard food security range from new crop varieties and 
climate-smart farming, to reallocation of agricultural production2,5.   
International trade can be an important adaptation mechanism6,7. Trade links food-deficit and -surplus 
countries and raises consumption possibilities through specialization according to comparative 
advantage. Climate change affects regions and crops differently8, possibly shifting regional comparative 
advantages and altering trade patterns. Studies report that restricting trade exacerbates the impact of 
climate change on agricultural production, while liberalizing trade alleviates it9–14. The current literature 
is, however, incomplete in its scenario design and does not comprehensively assess whether, and if so 
why, the role of trade becomes larger under climate change (see Method and Supplementary Text). The 
‘Adaptation Illusion Hypothesis’ argues that many farm practices are wrongly identified as adaptation 
because they have equal beneficial impacts with or without climate change15,16. We investigate the case 
of adaptation through trade, and reveal whether climate change alters the pattern of comparative 
advantage and increases the impact of trade integration on hunger. With the emerging integration 
between climate and trade policy agendas17, a better understanding is needed to guide international 
policies to reduce hunger. 
Prevailing trade barriers may affect trade’s adaptation potential. Border protection is widespread and 
importantly influences agri-food trade18,19. Despite substantial liberalization efforts under the ongoing 
Doha Round, tariffs remain high for agricultural products20. We investigate the impact of pre-Doha tariff 
levels as well as further liberalization of agricultural tariffs. Also other trade costs associated with 
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infrastructure, logistics and custom procedures are high, particularly in agricultural trade and in 
developing countries21. Reducing such barriers could create larger trade gains than reductions in border 
protection18. We compare the adaptation potential of trade liberalization – through reduction of tariff 
barriers - and facilitation – through reduction of other trade costs.  
We focus on global hunger projections towards 2050 and analyze how climate change and trade interact 
in their impact on hunger. Our economic (Global Biosphere Management Model, GLOBIOM) and crop 
(Environment Policy Integrated Model, EPIC) modeling approach (see Method) is well-established to 
investigate agricultural climate change impacts22–25. We advance on current literature by analyzing 60 
integrated scenarios that capture variability in trade barriers and in climate projections originating from 
general circulation models (GCMs), emissions scenarios (RCPs – Representative Concentration 
Pathways), and assumptions about CO2 fertilization. Through statistical analyses on the scenario sample 
we assess if, where and how climate change influences the effect of trade on the risk of hunger.  
The adaptive effect of international trade on global hunger  
Building on Baker et al.24, we use ten climate change and six trade scenarios, and analyze hunger effects 
at global and regional level. Four RCPs (2.6 Wm-2, 4.5 Wm-2, 6.0 Wm-2, and 8.5 Wm-2) are projected by 
HadGEM2-ES. RCP8.5 is also implemented with 4 alternative climate models (GFDL-ESM2M, NorESM1-
M, IPSL-CM5A-LR, and MIROC-ESM-CHEM). RCP2.6 represents climate stabilization at 2°C, while RCP8.5 
represents a likely temperature range of 2.6°C to 4.8°C26. We compare strongest climate change impacts 
(RCP8.5) with intermediate climate scenarios (RCP2.6 to RCP6.0). EPIC projects yields for climatic 
conditions of each RCP x GCM combination including CO2 fertilization, which are compared to yields 
without climate change impacts (No CC). RCP8.5 x HadGEM2-ES is also run without CO2 fertilization 
effects, representing the worst possible outcome. Our approach follows the ISI-MIP (www.isimip.org) 
Fast Track Protocol, which considers scenarios with CO2 fertilization as the default, and priorities RCP8.5 
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x HadGEM2-ES for CO2 sensitivity analyses. We provide a complete CO2 sensitivity analysis across RCPs in 
the Supplementary Text. In the Baseline trade scenario, trade barriers are kept constant at 2010 level, 
but trade patterns vary endogenously across different climate impact scenarios. The Fixed imports 
scenario prevents agricultural imports from exceeding levels from the No CC scenario. The Pre-Doha 
tariffs scenario represents the trade environment before global trade liberalization launched by the 
Doha Round. In the Facilitation scenario, additional costs from expanding trade volume beyond the 
current level (e.g. infrastructure costs) are set close to zero. Under the Tariff elimination scenario 
agricultural tariffs are progressively phased out from -25% in 2020, to -100% in 2050. The Facilitation + 
Tariff elimination scenario combines previous two scenarios. Socioeconomic developments are 
modelled with the second Shared Socio-Economic Pathway (SSP2)27. The scenarios are further discussed 
in Method. 
Through adjustments in trade, supply and demand, the 2050 global population at risk of hunger under 
climate change and trade scenarios deviates substantially from the SSP2 baseline (Baseline trade + No 
CC) (Fig. 1). Lower trade costs reduce importer prices, increase traded quantities, and/or increase 
exporter prices, while lower climate-induced crop yields increase prices. On the supply side, this 
influences the optimal land allocation within each pixel in terms of land cover, crop and management 
system. On the demand side, regions determine the optimal level of consumption and trade of each 
product in response to new price levels. Within-country distributional impacts of price changes through 
agricultural income effects are not considered (see Method). In Baseline trade, price changes across 
RCP8.5 scenarios lead to a reduction in global food availability of -0.2% to -3% compared to the baseline. 
The corresponding hunger effects are large: an additional 7 to 55 million people are projected to 
become undernourished (+6% to +45%). Across RCP8.5 scenarios, global cropland area changes by -2% 
to +3% and the share of irrigated area increases by 1% to 7%. Total agricultural trade volume increases 
by 1% to 7% across RCP8.5 scenarios through an expansion at intensive and extensive margin (new flows 
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representing 1% to 3% of total trade volume) (Supplementary Table 1).  Hunger impacts under 
intermediate climate change range from a reduction of 1 million to an increase of 14 million 
undernourished. In RCP2.6 undernourishment is lower than in No CC because crop yields in several 
regions increase or remain unaffected partly due to the CO2 fertilization effect (Extended Data Fig. 1 and 
Supplementary Fig.12). When adaptation through trade is constrained in Fixed imports, hunger 
exacerbates across all RCP8.5 scenarios, up to an additional 73 million undernourished compared to the 
baseline (+60%). By preventing endogenous market responses to climate change, Fixed imports results 
in lower global crop production efficiency (-1% to -2.5%), lower global food availability (-10 to -37 
kcal/cap/day), and higher agricultural prices (+2% to +17%) across RCP8.5 scenarios compared to 
Baseline trade (Supplementary Table 2). Pre-Doha tariffs lead to up to 81 million additional 
undernourished compared to baseline (+67%), highlighting the importance of trade integration already 






Fig. 1 | Global population at risk of hunger (million) in 2050 across climate change and trade scenarios. Climate change scenarios 
include the effect of CO2 fertilization on crop yields. RCP8.5 is implemented with and without the CO2 effect. The black dotted 
horizontal line indicates the population at risk of hunger in the SSP2 baseline (122 million). 
Facilitation and Tariff elimination reduce the global risk of hunger from climate change to a comparable 
extent, and Facilitation + Tariff elimination can even compensate the impact of all but the most extreme 
climate change scenario. Trade liberalization and facilitation reduce hunger by enhancing climate-
induced trade adjustments – total agricultural trade increases by 166% to 262% across RCP8.5 scenarios 
– by reducing agricultural prices, and by increasing food availability and crop production efficiency 
(Supplementary Table 1 and 2). The hunger effect under extreme climate change (RCP8.5 without CO2 
effect) is reduced by 31% under Facilitation, 11% under Tariff elimination and 64% under Facilitation + 
Tariff elimination. These effects are in line with other studies reporting 44% lower hunger effects under 





Regional perspective on climate change, hunger and trade  
The hunger outcomes of climate and trade scenarios differ substantially among the hunger-affected 
regions (Fig. 2). Climate change has little impact on regions facing positive or small negative crop yield 
impacts (CSI, MNA) or maintaining a high crop yield (LAC) (Extended Data Fig. 1 for average crop yield, 
Supplementary Fig. 1 – 4 for four main crops). Regions with negative impacts on medium crop yields 
face larger hunger impacts (EAS, SEA). SAS and SSA face the most severe hunger impacts from climate 
change. They experience negative impacts on already low yields, also when including the impact of 
supply-side adaptation on yields (Extended Data Fig. 2). Across RCP8.5 scenarios, projections for 
Baseline trade range from a 13% to 181% and 2% to 51% increase in population at risk of hunger for SAS 
and SSA. The effect of trade scenarios on regional undernourishment is largest among baseline net 
importing regions (SSA, MNA, EAS, SAS) and regions where climate change reduces net exports (SEA) 
(Extended Data Fig. 3 and 4). Fixed imports enlarges hunger impacts in the extreme climate change 
scenario in SSA, SAS and SEA by raising agricultural prices (Extended Data Fig. 5 and 6), increasing net 
exports in SEA, and reducing net imports in SSA and SAS. Adverse effects from trade restriction such as 
the export bans observed during the 2007-2008 world food crisis28,29 and feared as a result of the global 
COVID-19 pandemic30,31, may pose severe hunger risks under climate change. Under Pre-Doha tariffs 
undernourishment in SSA, SAS and EAS is substantially higher compared to Baseline trade. Tariff 
liberalization between 2001 and 2010 reduced average import tariffs in SSA, SAS and EAS by around 30% 
(Supplementary Table 6). The lower tariffs reduce the overall level of trade costs by 2050 
(Supplementary Table 7) and allow for larger agricultural net imports in SSA, SAS and EAS across all 
climate scenarios (Extended Data Fig. 3). In MNA the average import tariff reduced marginally and in SEA 
it was already low (Supplementary Table 6). Facilitation and Tariff elimination reduces hunger in SSA, 
MNA, and EAS across all climate scenarios by lowering average trade costs (Supplementary Table 7), 
thereby reducing agricultural prices and raising agricultural imports (Extended Data Fig. 3 and 5). In 
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some cases trade integration increases rather than reduces a region’s undernourishment under climate 
change. The largest adverse effects occur under Tariff elimination in SEA and SAS (Extended Data Fig. 7). 
While Facilitation reduces hunger in the extreme climate change scenario by 16% and 8%, Tariff 
elimination increases hunger impacts by 4% and 16% in SEA and SAS, respectively. Both trade scenarios 
reduce average trade costs (Supplementary Table 7), but tariff elimination increases rice exports from 
SAS and SEA, thereby reducing domestic calorie availability. Facilitation and Tariff elimination 
compensates calorie loss from rice exports through increased imports of other agricultural goods and 
lowers the hunger effect of extreme climate change by 26% and 11% in SEA and SAS. Our sensitivity 
analysis shows that the effects of trade on climate-induced hunger are robust to CO2 fertilization 
assumptions (Supplementary Fig. 13 & 14). 
Fig. 2 | Population at risk of hunger in 2050 (million) across climate change and trade scenarios in each region. Only results 
from the GCM HadGEM2-ES are shown – see Extended Data Fig. 7 for full scenario set. Regions are United States of America 
(USA), Russia and West Asia (CSI), East Asia (EAS), Southeast Asia (SEA), South Asia (SAS), Middle-East and North-Africa (MNA), 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Latin American Countries (LAC), Oceania (OCE), Canada (CAN) and Europe (EUR). The black dotted 





A larger role for trade under climate change? 
To reveal whether the effect of trade enlarges under climate change and thus plays a real adaptation 
role, we analyze hunger outcomes from GLOBIOM on crop yield shifts projected by EPIC and average 
trade costs in regional level regression models (Table 1). We interpret these results for a 5.4% reduction 
in crop yields and a 23% reduction in average trade costs, which correspond to average impacts of 
climate change and trade integration scenarios, respectively. Regression results reveal that a 5.4% 
reduction in crop yields within a region leads to an average food availability reduction of 11 
kcal/cap/day (95% confidence interval (CI), 15 – 8 kcal/cap/day) and an additional 0.52 million people at 
risk of hunger (CI, 0.25 – 0.79 million). For a 23% decrease in trade costs, we project an increase in 
average food availability within a region by 13 kcal/cap/day (CI, 9 – 16 kcal/cap/day) and a reduction of 
1.22 million people undernourished (CI, 1.52 – 0.93 million). When excluding regions that experience 
negative impacts in some trade scenarios (SAS, SEA), we find a significant negative interaction effect 
between trade costs and crop yields. For example, under extreme climate change (i.e. a 20% crop yield 
reduction), the positive effect of a 23% reduction in trade costs is 1.97 million fewer people 
undernourished, consisting of a direct (-1.50 million) and a climate-induced trade effect (-0.47 million). 
These results confirm the existence of positive trade effects on food availability and hunger 




Table 1 | Results from OLS estimation of the impact of crop yields, trade costs and their interaction on regional hunger and 
food availability. Observations are GLOBIOM output for the 11 world regions under five different trade scenarios (Baseline, pre-
Doha tariffs, Facilitation, Tariff elimination, and Facilitation + Tariff elimination) and ten climate change scenarios in 2050. The 
regression models are described in Method. 
  Population at risk of hunger (million) Food availability (kcal/cap/day) 
 sample (1) all regions (2) without SAS and SEA (1) all regions (2) without SAS and SEA 
Crop yield  
(% change) 
-9.70 *** -1.80   213.00 *** 173.00 *** 
(2.60)  (1.40)  (29.00)  (31.00)  
Trade cost (log 
of US$/106 kcal) 
4.70 *** 5.80 *** -49.00 *** -80.00 *** 
(0.58)  (0.73)  (7.40)  (9.40)  
Crop yield x 
Trade cost  
3.30  -8.90 ** 14.00  191.00 *** 
(6.20)   (3.60)   (60.00)   (74.00)   
Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Regional fixed effects included. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in brackets. N 
= 550 for (1) and 450 for (2). Adjusted R squared is 0.890 (1) and 0.930 (2) for hunger regressions and 0.950 (1) and 0.920 (2) for food 
availability regressions.  
 
We run the regressions presented in Table 1 with regional interaction effects (Supplementary Table 3). 
In most regions, climate-induced decreases in crop yields reduce food availability and increase hunger 
while reduced trade costs have opposite effects. The food availability impacts of crop yield changes are 
largest for SAS, SSA and SEA, while the effect of trade costs is largest for regions maintaining net imports 
under climate change (SSA, MNA and EAS). The corresponding impact on hunger is largest in low-income 
regions (SSA and SAS), followed by middle-income regions (EAS, MNA, and SEA). The interaction effect, 
which reveals if climate change alters the relation between trade costs and hunger, is most pronounced 
in SSA, followed by EAS. Fig. 3 plots the predicted hunger-yield relationship in EAS and SSA for different 
trade cost levels, illustrating that hunger is less sensitive to climate-induced yield changes under 




Fig. 3 | Fitted linear response of population at risk of hunger (million) to climate-induced crop yield change in EAS and SSA 
for different values of trade costs (1st decile, median, 9th decile). Shaded areas indicate prediction intervals. Prediction based 
on an OLS estimation of the regional level linear regression of the impact of crop yield change, trade costs and their interaction 
on population at risk of hunger. Regression results are shown in Supplementary Table 3 and the regression model is described 
in Method. Extended Data Fig. 8 presents the fitted response for all regions. 
Inter-regional specialization  
In Fig. 4 we assess to what extent climate change shifts the pattern of comparative advantage of four 
important crops (corn, wheat, soya, and rice). In line with Ricardo’s theory, a region is regarded as 
having a comparative advantage when it specializes in a certain crop, such that its share of world 
production increases when trade costs decrease (see Method and Supplementary Text). Under no 
climate change, trade integration increases the global production share of USA in corn, LAC in soya, CSI, 
EUR and LAC in wheat, and SAS and EAS in rice (Fig. 4a). Trade integration has similar impacts on 
specialization under climate change (Fig. 4b). Fig. 4c compares regions’ specialization in response to 
trade cost reduction, with negative values indicating reductions and positive values gains in comparative 
advantage under climate change compared to no climate change. For example, MNA still decreases its 
share of global wheat production in response to trade integration under climate change, but to a lesser 
extent than under no climate change. The small and mainly insignificant values indicate that the pattern 
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of comparative advantage of the four crops remains similar under climate change. While climate change 
affects crop yields and cost competitiveness of regions, it does not radically alter the relative position 
between regions (Supplementary Fig. 8 - 10). Results on crop shares in a region’s total production, 
export shares in a region’s crop production, and revealed comparative advantage corroborate this 
finding (Supplementary Fig. 6, 7 and 11).  
 
Fig. 4 | Inter-regional specialization in corn, rice, soya, and wheat in response to trade cost reduction in 2050. a) presents the 
share of global production under no climate change in Baseline trade and Facilitation + Tariff Elimination. In b) each point shows 
the estimated impact of a 1% trade cost reduction for each region on share of world production in percentage, with lines denoting 
the corresponding 95% confidence interval (heteroskedastic robust standard errors). Idem for c), except that the outcome 
variable is the difference in share of world production compared to no climate change. Regression models are described in 
Method. 
Adaptation to climate change occurs through changes in existing and new inter-regional trade flows 
(Supplementary Tables 8 - 11). Across RCP8.5 scenarios, the largest export growth originates from major 
baseline producing regions (corn from USA and LAC, soya from LAC and USA, rice from SAS and SEA, and 
wheat from EUR and CAN, Supplementary Fig. 9). The largest new trade flows are new corn exports from 
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USA to EAS, CAN, LAC, and SEA, from EUR to MNA and from LAC to EAS; new soya exports from LAC to 
SAS and from USA to CAN and MNA; and new wheat exports from CSI to EUR, and from MNA to SSA. 
Climate change does not induce substantial new rice trade flows. There is uncertainty across RCP8.5 
scenarios in bilateral trade patterns, but several exports to hunger-affected regions increase consistently 
(e.g. wheat from EUR to SSA, soya from LAC to SAS, or corn from LAC to MNA). Hunger-affected regions 
are, however, not only engaging in trade at the importer side, but also increase certain exports (wheat 
in MNA, corn in SSA, and rice in EAS and SAS) (Extended Data Fig. 10).  
Discussion 
International trade contributes globally to climate change adaptation. The impact of worst climate 
change on global risk of hunger increases by 33% to 47% under restricted trade scenarios, and decreases 
by 11% to 64% under open trade scenarios. The gain from reducing trade costs is largest for regions that 
remain import-dependent under climate change. Climate change increases the role of trade in reducing 
the risk of hunger for some regions, although it does not substantially alter the pattern of comparative 
advantage of main staple crops. It is the ability to link food surplus with deficit regions that underpins 
trade’s adaptation effect. These conclusions are robust across RCPs, and independent from the 
assumption on CO2 fertilization effects. Lastly we find that the number of undernourished increases with 
climate change, irrespective of trade scenarios. Climate change mitigation thus remains crucial for 
hunger eradication. 
Our study is comprehensive in its scenario design and rigorous in its analysis of the processes driving 
adaptation through trade. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the focus of this study is global and 
long term.  Trade policies and climate change have important within-country distributional 
consequences through income and food access effects33–35, which are theoretically ambiguous and 
which our modelling approach does not consider. Across households with different food access 
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channels, from urban net-consumers to rural subsistence farmers, impacts can differ even in their 
direction34.  Also, current global studies, including ours, focus on crop and grass yield impacts, and other 
direct and indirect climate change effects are so far not represented, e.g. heat stress on animals, pest 
and disease incidence, sea level rise or reduced pollination. Finally, we take a long-term equilibrium 
perspective ignoring the negative effects of extreme weather events. All these aspects require 
substantial new research.  
Albeit the limitations mentioned above, our study brings novel policy implications. We find that 
liberalization already achieved under the Doha Round substantially reduces climate-induced hunger 
impacts. A careful approach to trade integration covering different types of trade barriers can further 
limit hunger risks. The full removal of agricultural tariffs leads to increases in food availability in SSA, 
MNA and EAS, but may increase exports and lower regional food availability in SEA and SAS. Further 
trade facilitation can reduce undernourishment in all hunger-affected regions. The effective realization 
of trade facilitation requires, however, considerable investments in transport infrastructure and 
technology. Especially in low-income regions, like SSA, infrastructure is weak36. An estimated $130 – 170 
billion a year is needed to bridge the infrastructure gap in SSA by 202537. Infrastructure finance averaged 
75$ billion in recent years, with largest contribution from budget constrained national governments37. 
Alternative financing through institutional and private investments, called for by the African 
Development Bank Group and the World Bank Group36,37, could be not only crucial for economic growth, 
but for climate change adaptation as well. In essence, our results demonstrate that trade instruments 
can mitigate an important part of the adverse hunger effects of long-term climate change. Our results 
thereby endorse the importance of holistic approaches to international trade negotiations, and could 
prove also relevant in the face of trade policy reactions in more acute crisis situations, such the global 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
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Extended Data  
 
ED Fig. 1 | Biophysical impact of climate change on average crop yield in each region by 2050 as projected by the EPIC crop 
model. Yields in ton dry matter per ha. The x-axis indicates the crop yield under no climate change and y-axis the crop yield under 
climate change for different RCP x GCM combinations without market feedback and adaptation measures. Under no climate 
change yields are determined by base year yield and assumptions on technological development over time, under climate change 
an additional climate impact shifter is applied. Points above the black line indicate an increase in crop yield, points below a 





ED Fig. 2 | Impact of climate change on average crop yield after supply-side adaptation in each region by 2050 as projected by 
GLOBIOM. Yields in ton dry matter per ha. The x-axis indicates the crop yield under no climate change and y-axis the crop yield 
under climate change for different RCP x GCM combinations with GLOBIOM market feedback and supply-side adaptation (changes 
in management system and reallocation of production across spatial units in response to price changes). Points above the black 




ED Fig. 3 | Net agricultural trade of baseline net importing regions in 2050 under trade and climate change scenarios. Net 




ED Fig. 4 | Net agricultural trade of baseline net exporting regions in 2050 under trade and climate change scenarios. Net 




ED Fig. 5 | Change in agricultural prices of baseline net importing regions in 2050 under trade and climate change scenarios 




ED Fig. 6 |Change in agricultural prices of baseline net exporting regions in 2050 under trade and climate change scenarios 




ED Fig. 7 | Change in population at risk of hunger in 2050 in hunger-affected regions under climate change and trade scenarios 




ED Fig. 8 | Plot of the fitted linear response of population at risk of hunger (million) to climate-induced crop yield change for 
different values of trade costs (1st decile, median, 9th decile). Shaded areas indicate prediction intervals. Prediction based on an 
OLS estimation of a regional level linear regression of the impact of crop yield change, trade costs and their interaction on 





ED Fig. 9 | Share of production volume that each region represents of total world production for corn, rice, soya and wheat in 
the SSP2 baseline in 2050. The projected total world production by 2050 in the SSP2 baseline is 1213 Mt for corn, 884 Mt for 




ED Fig. 10 | Net trade (1000 ton) in East Asia (EAS), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), South Asia (SAS) and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) for corn, rice, soya and wheat under climate change and trade scenarios in 2050. Net agricultural trade in ton dry 





Modelling framework We use the Global Biosphere Management Model (GLOBIOM), a recursive 
dynamic, spatially explicit, economic partial equilibrium model of the agriculture, forestry and bioenergy 
sector with bilateral trade flows and costs, which can model new trade patterns38. The model computes 
a market equilibrium in 10-year time steps from 2000 to 2050 by maximizing welfare (the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus) subject to technological, resource and political constraints. In each 
time step, market prices adjust endogenously to equalize supply and demand for each product and 
region. On the demand side, a representative consumer for each of 30 economic regions optimizes 
consumption and trade in response to product prices and income. Food demand depends endogenously 
on product prices via an iso-elastic demand function and exogenously on GDP and population 
projections39. We mainly present model results aggregated to 11 regions (Supplementary Table 4): 
United States of America (USA), Canada (CAN), Europe (EUR), Oceania (OCE), Southeast Asia (SEA), 
South Asia (SAS), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle-East and North-Africa (MNA), East Asia (EAS), Russia 
and West Asia (CSI) and Latin American Countries (LAC). GLOBIOM is a bottom-up model building on a 
high spatial grid-level resolution on the supply side. Land is disaggregated into Simulation Units, clusters 
of 5 arcmin pixels which are aggregated based on altitude, slope and soil class, 30 arcmin pixel, and 
country boundaries. GLOBIOM’s crop production sector includes 18 major crops (barley, beans, cassava, 
chickpeas, corn, cotton, groundnut, millet, palm oil, potato, rapeseed, rice, soybean, sorghum, 
sugarcane, sunflower, sweet potato, wheat) under 4 management systems (irrigated – high input, 
rainfed – high input, rainfed – low input, and subsistence). The allocation of acreage by crop and 
management system is determined by potential yields, production costs and expansion constraints23. 
Crop production parameters are based on the detailed biophysical crop model EPIC. Additional 
biophysical models are used to represent the livestock [RUMINANT – Herrero et al.40] and forestry [G4M 
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– Forsell et al.41] sectors. Further information on model structure and parameters is documented in 
Havlík et al.42,43.  
As a partial equilibrium model, GLOBIOM focuses only on specific sectors of the economy and does not 
represent feedbacks on consumer income and GDP from trade and climate change. Yet, the partial 
equilibrium model allows for more detail in represented sectors, and a more accurate assessment of 
biophysical impacts. This because of high spatial and commodity resolution and physical instead of 
monetary representation of variables, compared to general equilibrium models which explicitly cover 
income feedbacks. Crop yields adjust endogenously through the management system or location of 
production, and exogenously according to long-term technological development and climate change 
impacts23. Output from EPIC is used to compute in each time step yield shifters for each climate change 
scenario and each crop and management system at a disaggregated spatial scale (Simulation Unit). EPIC 
simulates scenario-specific yields based on inputs from climate models (daily climatic conditions 
including solar radiation, min and max temperature, precipitation, wind speed, relative humidity, and 
CO2 concentration). Climate change impacts on livestock production are modelled through crop and 
grassland yield impacts on feed availability. EPIC crop and grassland yield impacts, and their 
implementation in GLOBIOM, are further explained in Leclère et al.23 and Baker et al.24. 
International trade International trade is represented in GLOBIOM through Enke-Samuelson-Takayama-
Judge spatial equilibrium assuming homogenous goods38,44. Bilateral trade flows between the 30 
economic regions are determined by the initial trade pattern, relative production costs of regions, and 
the minimization of trading costs38. The initial trade pattern is informed by the BACI database from CEPII 
averaging across 1998 – 200245. Trade costs are composed of tariffs from the MAcMap-HS6 database46, 
transport costs47 and a non-linear trade expansion cost. The MAcMap-HS6 2001 release from CEPII-ITC 
provides ad valorem and specific tariffs, and shadow tariff rates of tariff rate quotas for the model 
calibration in the base year 200048. To incorporate trade liberalization developments under the Doha 
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Round, the tariff data is updated in the 2010 time step with the 2010 release of MAcMap-HS649 
(Supplementary Table 6). We use the estimation from Hummels (2001) to compile input data on 
bilateral transport costs based on the distance between trade pairs and the weight-value ratio of 
agricultural products. Transport costs are set to 30 USD/ton minimum, based on the 5th percentile of the 
OECD Maritime Transport Cost database (2003 – 2007), and are kept constant at base year level over 
the simulation period as the drivers of transport costs (e.g. fuel prices, containerization50) are not 
represented in the partial equilibrium model. In the scenario simulations, the non-linear expansion cost 
raises per unit trade costs when traded quantity increases over time to model persistency in trade flows. 
A constant elasticity function is used for trade flows observed in the base year, and a quadratic function 
for new trade flows. The non-linear element reflects the cost of trade expansion in terms of 
infrastructure and capacity constraints in the transport sector and is reset after each 10 year time step. 
Compared to other global economic models, GLOBIOM’s trade representation is positioned between the 
rigid Armington approach of general equilibrium models and the flexible world pool market approach of 
many partial equilibrium models.  
Risk of hunger We measure the population at risk of hunger, or the number of people whose food 
availability falls below the mean minimum dietary energy requirement, based on Hasegawa et al.51–53. 
Four parameters are used: the mean minimum dietary energy requirement (MDER), the coefficient of 
variation (CV) of the distribution of food within a country, the mean food availability in the country (kcal 
per capita per day), and total population. Minimum dietary energy requirements are exogenously 
calculated based on demographic composition (age, sex) of future population projections. Future 
changes in the inequality of food distribution within a country are exogenous and follow projected 
national income growth. This is based on an estimated relationship between income and the CV of food 
distribution with observed historical national-level data. Poor infrastructure, remoteness and a high 
prevalence of subsistence farming limit local markets in distributing food equally across households7. 
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Income is lowest in SAS and SSA, regions where the share of land under subsistence farming is the 
largest (27% in SAS and 43% in SSA)54. Food availability in kcal per capita per day is endogenously 
determined by GLOBIOM at the regional level. One limitation of the approach is that it does not include 
within-country distributional consequences of trade integration and/or climate change through income 
effects. Trade policies and climate change alter food prices, which affects individual incomes, purchasing 
power and food access depending on households being net-consumers or net-producers of food33. At 
the aggregate regional level, the bias from not considering these distributional effects may be upward or 
downward, depending on the share of net-consuming vs. net-producing households, degree of 
subsistence farming vs. agricultural wage work, and share of rural vs. urban population in each country.  
Climate change adaptation Climate change adaptation is defined by the IPCC as “The process of 
adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects”26. Adaptation of the agricultural sector to 
climate-induced changes in crop yields may include adjustments in consumption, production and 
international trade2. Demand-side adaptation is captured in GLOBIOM by changes in regional 
consumption levels in response to market prices. Supply-side adaptation includes the reallocation of 
land for each crop by grid-cell and management system, and the expansion of cropland to other land 
covers23. Whereas Leclère et al.23 assess supply-side adaptation, this study focuses on international 
market responses, where our analysis approach is inspired by the ‘Adaptation illusion Hypothesis’ 
postulated by Lobell15 and confirmed by Moore et al.55. They argue that farm-level practices identified as 
adaptation measures by many crop modelling studies, cannot be referred to as climate adaptation as 
they have the same yield impact in current climate as under climate change. In a similar fashion, we 
intend to investigate whether, where, and if so, why, trade integration has a larger positive impact on 
the risk of hunger under climate change. We define the adaptation effect of trade as the sum of the 
effect of reducing trade costs on hunger under current climate (direct trade effect), and any additional 
positive or negative impact of trade integration under climate change (climate-induced trade effect). 
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The adaptation effect of trade can be understood through Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage 
(see also Supplementary Text)11,12. Reducing trade costs promotes trade according to comparative 
advantage56 and facilitates the role of trade as a transmission belt in linking food deficit and food surplus 
regions57. Climate change impacts differ across crops and regions8. Depending on the spatial distribution 
of these impacts, the current pattern of comparative advantage may be intensified, maintained or 
radically altered. This may lead to increased food deficits in certain regions. Trade is argued to have a 
larger role under climate change as it facilitates adjustment to changes in comparative advantage11,12 
and allows to link food surplus with food deficit regions6,7,57. 
Scenario design Our choice of climate change scenarios is determined by the ISI-MIP Fast Track Protocol 
used by crop modelers to calculate crop and grass yield impacts8,58. We use all four representative 
concentration pathways (RCPs) that reflect increasing levels of radiative forcing by 2100 (2.6 Wm-2 
scenario, 4.5 Wm-2 scenario, 6 Wm-2 scenario and 8.5 Wm-2 scenario)59 as projected by the HadGEM2-ES 
general circulation model (GCM)60,61. RCP8.5 is implemented with 4 additional GCMs to reflect 
uncertainty in climate models: GFDL-ESM2M62, IPSL-CM5A-LR63, MIROC-ESM-CHEM64, and NorESM1-
M65. RCP2.6 represents climate stabilization at 2°C and RCP8.5 a temperature range of 2.6°C to 4.8°C26. 
Yield impacts are based on simulations from the crop model EPIC23,24. Each RCP x GCM combination is 
modelled including CO2 fertilization effects. RCP8.5 x HadGEM2-ES is additionally simulated without the 
CO2 effect, which reflects the most severe climate change scenario. These scenarios represent the Tier 1 
set of ISI-MIP scenarios and climate change impacts are simulated individually for all 18 GLOBIOM crops, 
except for oil palm, and for grasslands. Scenarios without CO2 fertilization for other RCPs than RCP8.5 
were considered of secondary importance in the ISI-MIP Fast Track – and in the latest simulation 
protocol for ISI-MIP 3b – and thus were available only for four main crops (corn, rice, soya, wheat). We 
carry out a comprehensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the CO2 fertilization effect for all RCPs, 
however, as this requires extrapolating climate change impacts from the four crops to the other crops, 
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and thus would introduce inconsistency with the Tier 1 scenarios, the analysis is presented separately in 
Supplementary Text. In the scenario with no climate change (No CC) exogenous yield change originates 
only from long-term technological development assumptions. 
We implement six trade scenarios to analyze the role of trade in climate change adaptation. The first 
scenario, Fixed imports, limits imports to the level observed in the No CC scenario or less. This 
represents restricting trade flow adjustments in response to climate change, or limiting trade as an 
adaptation mechanism. The second scenario, Pre-Doha tariffs, excludes the tariff update in 2010, 
representing the trade environment before global trade liberalization launched by the Doha Round (see 
Supplementary Table 6 for comparison of average tariff rates). We additionally implement three trade 
integration scenarios to assess promotion of the trade adaptation mechanism. In the first scenario, 
Facilitation, the non-linear part of trade costs is set close to zero from 2020 onwards, following Baker et 
al.24. This reflects the impact of reducing transaction costs, infrastructure costs and other institutional 
barriers limiting the expansion of trade1. The per unit transport costs are kept constant at the base year 
level. In the second scenario, Tariff elimination, all agricultural tariffs are progressively phased out 
between 2020 and 2050, i.e. -25% in 2020, -50% in 2030, -75% in 2040 and -100% in 2050. This scenario 
leads to a 70% growth in total agricultural trade (Supplementary Table 1), comparable in magnitude to 
the agricultural import (+36%) and export (+60%) growth under tariff liberalization reported by 
Anderson and Martin66. The last one, Facilitation + Tariff elimination, is a combination of the previous 
two and presents the most extensive open trade scenario. In the Baseline trade scenario trade barriers 
                                                          
1 Trade facilitation is defined by the WTO as the “simplification of trade procedures”71. In economic literature it refers 
to the reduction of trade transaction costs that are determined by the efficiency of customs procedures, 
infrastructure services, domestic regulations etc. 18,71. Other trade costs that are relevant in agricultural trade are 
non-tariff measures (NTMs). UNCTAD defines NTMs as “all policy-related trade costs incurred from production to 
final consumer, with the exclusion of tariffs” 72. Typical examples of NTMs are technical measures such as sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures (SPS), and price and quantity control measures such as quotas and subsidies. Some 
studies include also the above mentioned transaction costs in the category of non-tariff measures (NTMs)73,74, while 
others make the explicit distinction18,75. 
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are kept constant at 2010 levels, but trade patterns vary endogenously across the different climate 
impact scenarios. Supplementary Table 7 provides a comparison of average trade costs across the 
different scenarios.  
Socioeconomic developments are modelled according to the second Shared Socio-Economic Pathway 
(SSP2), which reflects a ‘Middle of the Road’ scenario where population reaches 9.2 billion by 2050 and 
income grows according to historical trends in each region27. The technological development assumed 
by SSP2 leads to an increase in global average crop yields of 66% between 2000 and 2050 
(Supplementary Table 12). The SSP scenarios are widely discussed and often used as a basis for 
harmonizing key macroeconomic assumptions for integrated assessment modeling of different climate 
futures, e.g. Riahi et al.67. SSP2 projects a decrease in the global population at risk of hunger from 867 
million in 2000 to 122 million by 2050. This because of an increase in food consumption – global food 
availability increases from 2700 to 3007 kcal/cap/day – and an improved food distribution within 
regions, which are both related to the assumed income growth under SSP268. Income projections lead to 
changes in food preferences. Under SSP2, the share of livestock products in diets increases globally from 
16% in 2000 to 17.3% in 2050, with largest increases in Asian regions69. Such changes affect the baseline 
trade pattern: e.g. increased production and consumption of livestock products in SAS, EAS and SEA 
imply an increase in imports of feed crops such as corn and soya by 2050. 
Statistical analysis – hunger regression We analyze the results from the scenario runs with a regional 
level linear regression model to infer the underlying relationship between trade costs, crop yield 
changes, and hunger as predicted by GLOBIOM. The following models are estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) (Table 1): 
 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 
 𝛽1
(1)
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽2
(1)
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛽3
(1)
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽4𝑖
(1)





𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 
 𝛽1
(2)
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽2
(2)
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟 + 𝛽3
(2)
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽4𝑖
(2)
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟
(2)
  
We  estimate the models also with regional interaction terms (Fig. 3 and Supplementary Table 3): 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 
∑  (𝛽1𝑖
(3)
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑖
(3) 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑖
(3)𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟
𝑖




𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 
 ∑(𝛽1𝑖
(4)
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑖
(4)
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑖
(4)
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟
𝑖





Population at risk of hungeritr gives the number of people at risk of hunger (million) and Food 
availabilityitr the food availability (kcal/cap/day) in 2050 in each region 𝑖, trade scenario 𝑡 and climate 
change scenario 𝑟. Crop yieldir gives the change in average crop yield (kcal/ha) compared to average crop 
yield in no climate change in 2050. Trade costitr gives the log of the weighted average trade costs 
(US$/106 kcal) on all trade flows in 2050. To obtain a measure that reflects the implication of trade 
scenarios on overall trading costs, we calculate the trade-weighted average of trade costs over all 
agricultural imports, exports and intra-regional trade flows for each region 𝑖, trade scenario 𝑡 and 





𝑘  . 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑟 are the trade 
flows of crop 𝑘 in, out and within region 𝑖 in each scenario (𝑡, 𝑟) and 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑟 is the sum of all trade 
flows in, out and within region 𝑖 in each scenario (𝑡, 𝑟). The variables Crop yieldir and Trade costitr are 
centered (demeaned) to solve structural multicollinearity. For the regional fixed effects (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) 





 are the slope coefficients to be estimated for variable 𝑘 in regression model 𝑚 (with 𝑘 = 1, … ,4 
and 𝑚 = 1, … , 4). 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟
(𝑚)
 is an independently and identically normally distributed error term with zero 
mean and 𝜎(𝑚)
2  variance. Standard errors are estimated robust to heteroscedasticity using the HC3 
method as recommended by Long and Ervin702. The calculation of standard errors of the regional 
interaction effects is done with the Delta Method. The F statistic of overall significance rejects the null 
hypothesis at 1% significance level for all models. The sample is composed of GLOBIOM regional output 
under five different trade scenarios (Baseline, pre-Doha tariffs, Facilitation, Tariff elimination, and 
Facilitation + Tariff elimination) and ten climate change scenarios in 2050. The sample size is 550 for 
models with regional fixed effects [11 regions x 5 trade x 10 climate change scenarios] and 450 for 
models with regional interaction terms [9 regions (EUR and CAN excluded) x 5 trade x 10 climate change 
scenarios]. Summary statistics of all variables are shown in Supplementary Table 5. 
Statistical analysis - comparative advantage To assess comparative advantage we estimate a linear 
regression model of the effect of trade cost reduction on the share of production of a crop that region 𝑖 
represents in total world production of the crop in each trade scenario 𝑡 and climate change scenario 𝑟 
(Share of world productionitr); the share of each crop in a region’s total crop production (Share of 
regional crop productionitr); and the share of a region’s production that is exported (Share of production 
exporteditr). The following models are estimated separately for wheat, corn, rice and soya by OLS (Fig. 4 
and Supplementary Fig. 16 and 17): 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑟 = ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
(5)







                                                          
2 HC3 is a refined version of White’s method for estimation of heteroskedastic standard errors (HC0). Long and Ervin 




𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑟 = ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
(6)




𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟
(6) 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟 = ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
(7)




𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑟
(7) 
For sub-panels b, the dependent variable is the outcome under climate change, while for sub-panels c, 
the dependent variable is the difference in outcome between climate change and no climate change. 
Trade costsitr is the log of trade-weighted average of trade costs (USD/ton) per region 𝑖, trade scenario 𝑡 
and climate change scenario 𝑟 (Supplementary Table 7). The variable Trade costitr is centered 
(demeaned) to solve structural multicollinearity. Dummy variables are used for regional fixed effects 
(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖). Observations are taken from the nine RCP x GCM scenarios and four trade integration 
scenarios (Baseline trade, Facilitation, Tariff, Facilitation + Tariff) with exclusion of regions that have a 
deficit production at least 90% of the trade and climate change scenarios. N is 189 for corn, 180 for rice, 
98 for soya and 246 for wheat. Standard errors are estimated robust to heteroscedasticity using the HC3 
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Supplementary Fig. 1 | Corn yield under climate change and under no climate change in each region by 2050 projected by the 
EPIC crop model. Yields in ton dry matter per ha. Under no climate change yields are determined by base year yields and 
assumptions on technological development over time, under climate change an additional climate impact shifter is applied. 
 
Supplementary Fig. 2 | Rice yield under climate change and no climate change in each region by 2050 projected by the EPIC 
crop model. Yields in ton dry matter per ha. Under no climate change yields are determined by base year yield and assumptions 




Supplementary Fig. 3 | Soya yield under climate change and no climate change in each region by 2050 projected by the EPIC 
crop model. Yields in ton dry matter per ha. Under no climate change yields are determined by base year yield and assumptions 
on technological development over time, under climate change an additional climate impact shifter is applied. 
 
Supplementary Fig. 4 | Wheat yield under climate change and no climate change in each region by 2050 projected by the EPIC 
crop model. Yields in ton dry matter per ha. Under no climate change yields are determined by base year yield and assumptions 





Supplementary Table 1 | Global agricultural trade adjustments under trade and climate change scenarios by 2050. 
Total trade growth and specific extensive margin trade growth, the latter indicated as new trade flows compared to 
the 2000 trade pattern, the baseline SSP2 trade pattern, or the No CC trade pattern. RCP: Representative 
Concentration Pathway, GCM: General Circulation Model. Climate change scenarios include the effect of CO2 
fertilization on crop yields. RCP8.5 is also implemented without the CO2 effect (RCP8.5 wo). 
   
Trade adjustments 

















of new trade 
flows w.r.t.  
No CC  
(1000 ton) 
SPP2 Baseline     
No CC None Baseline 2 231 882 34 485 0 0 
Trade and Climate Change scenarios 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Baseline 2 279 118 36 859 27 603 27 603 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Baseline 2 296 414 38 420 27 019 27 019 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Baseline 2 331 759 37 971 36 719 36 719 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Baseline 2 392 550 35 078 72 927 72 927 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Baseline 2 312 236 40 476 39 203 39 203 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Baseline 2 310 881 38 543 35 854 35 854 
RCP8.5 MIROC  Baseline 2 348 640 36 387 38 593 38 593 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Baseline 2 258 274 36 500 24 813 24 813 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Baseline 2 296 093 44 733 53 881 53 881 
No CC None Fixed imports 2 231 726 34 475 0 0 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports 1 997 757 32 063 0 0 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports 1 993 885 32 095 0 0 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports 2 002 783 31 817 0 0 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Fixed imports 2 081 805 31 172 0 0 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports 1 896 043 31 165 0 0 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Fixed imports 1 983 152 30 977 0 0 
RCP8.5 MIROC  Fixed imports 1 950 371 30 541 0 0 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Fixed imports 2 021 484 31 656 0 0 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports 1 814 691 31 475 0 0 
No CC None Pre-Doha tariffs 1 046 349 27 493 194 246 0 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs 1 137 845 30 149 206 727 70 453 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs 1 153 749 31 735 200 281 75 508 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs 1 158 766 31 224 212 409 72 076 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Pre-Doha tariffs 1 190 440 28 164 243 935 57 923 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs 1 205 015 34 072 208 108 99 349 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Pre-Doha tariffs 1 172 956 31 732 209 515 67 207 
RCP8.5 MIROC  Pre-Doha tariffs 1 229 682 28 918 221 895 97 333 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Pre-Doha tariffs 1 108 162 29 159 197 632 65 287 




Supplementary Table 1 continued. 
 
  Trade adjustments 




















No CC None Facilitation 4 808 943 45 157 126 711 0 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 4 700 270 47 367 143 739 162 972 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 4 637 072 50 034 157 980 180 892 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 4 731 794 49 026 147 581 210 790 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Facilitation 4 932 717 47 846 161 146 133 028 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 4 375 589 52 343 171 053 361 853 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Facilitation 4 618 677 50 190 163 629 132 825 
RCP8.5 MIROC  Facilitation 4 710 517 49 657 195 841 223 134 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Facilitation 4 750 893 50 412 172 771 105 570 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 4 035 029 54 202 187 829 384 270 
No CC None Tariff elimination 3 790 254 67 245 657 770 0 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 3 879 544 67 863 715 503 33 870 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 3 873 057 69 490 674 132 25 098 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 3 975 979 68 151 721 417 34 852 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Tariff elimination 3 987 976 64 978 770 460 52 951 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 3 793 240 70 838 672 491 41 509 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Tariff elimination 3 840 614 67 378 681 601 45 064 
RCP8.5 MIROC Tariff elimination 3 915 428 65 089 737 766 45 928 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Tariff elimination 3 849 080 65 463 699 887 21 403 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 3 592 066 77 612 643 519 47 724 
No CC None Facilitation + Tariff 7 376 216 120 597 2 271 954 0 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 7 274 863 118 722 2 258 514 138 416 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 7 041 356 119 501 2 039 335 176 055 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 7 559 279 118 072 2 361 007 73 203 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Facilitation + Tariff 8 077 702 116 314 2 718 236 95 738 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 6 576 789 118 638 2 066 236 195 542 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Facilitation + Tariff 7 089 250 120 332 2 079 449 124 048 
RCP8.5 MIROC Facilitation + Tariff 7 115 186 114 886 2 275 812 143 824 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Facilitation + Tariff 7 424 135 120 259 2 290 354 74 486 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 5 937 251 119 122 1 745 582 303 873 





Supplementary Table 2 | Global market responses to trade scenarios compared to the Baseline trade scenario by 
2050 under the different climate change scenarios. RCP: Representative Concentration Pathway, GCM: General 
Circulation Model. Climate change scenarios include the effect of CO2 fertilization on crop yields. RCP8.5 is also 
implemented without the CO2 effect (RCP8.5 wo). Global crop production efficiency is defined as the total global 
crop production over the total global cropland area.  
      Market responses 

























No CC None Fixed imports 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.09% 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports -1.87% -1.92% -14.24 1.90% 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports -1.87% -2.06% -11.70 2.36% 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports -1.56% -2.18% -14.39 2.16% 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Fixed imports -1.97% -2.40% -16.41 2.18% 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Fixed imports -1.56% -2.24% -18.13 3.08% 
RCP8.5 MIROC  Fixed imports -2.22% -2.77% -16.70 16.68% 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Fixed imports -1.05% -1.48% -9.53 1.72% 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports -2.24% -2.35% -19.52 3.42% 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Fixed imports -2.45% -2.67% -36.85 8.58% 
No CC None Pre-Doha tariffs -2.63% -4.19% -50.43 5.13% 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs -2.37% -3.51% -41.43 4.39% 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs -1.89% -3.23% -41.76 4.17% 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs -2.07% -3.62% -45.85 4.47% 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Pre-Doha tariffs -2.74% -4.20% -44.35 4.74% 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Pre-Doha tariffs -1.65% -3.08% -41.95 4.16% 
RCP8.5 MIROC  Pre-Doha tariffs -2.07% -3.39% -46.69 4.43% 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Pre-Doha tariffs -1.86% -3.30% -42.92 4.24% 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs -1.61% -2.62% -42.45 4.24% 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Pre-Doha tariffs -1.51% -2.19% -39.44 4.41% 
No CC None Facilitation 2.66% 1.49% 31.65 -3.23% 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 2.29% 1.53% 35.35 -3.40% 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 1.55% 1.12% 35.96 -3.51% 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 3.11% 2.48% 35.34 -3.81% 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Facilitation 3.11% 2.10% 33.37 -3.85% 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Facilitation 1.93% 1.46% 28.09 -3.64% 
RCP8.5 MIROC Facilitation 1.06% 0.55% 33.89 -3.41% 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Facilitation 1.82% 1.19% 35.42 -3.46% 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation 1.63% 1.34% 32.48 -3.84% 





Supplementary Table 2 continued. 
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No CC None Tariff elimination 2.34% 1.86% 29.29 -3.59% 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 1.78% 1.52% 27.94 -3.55% 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 1.85% 1.58% 28.78 -3.60% 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 2.29% 2.01% 30.56 -3.74% 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Tariff elimination 1.70% 1.23% 23.31 -3.22% 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Tariff elimination 1.90% 1.72% 29.23 -3.53% 
RCP8.5 MIROC Tariff elimination 1.92% 1.72% 27.63 -3.65% 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Tariff elimination 2.06% 1.85% 25.23 -3.82% 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 1.79% 1.67% 31.95 -3.64% 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Tariff elimination 1.53% 1.17% 18.11 -2.54% 
NoCC None Facilitation + Tariff 2.03% 0.06% 65.49 -9.75% 
RCP2.6 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 2.87% 1.57% 73.87 -11.23% 
RCP4.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 2.14% 1.36% 67.91 -10.93% 
RCP6.0 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 2.98% 1.98% 72.34 -11.53% 
RCP8.5 GFDL-ESM2M Facilitation + Tariff 2.52% 1.37% 75.56 -11.77% 
RCP8.5 IPSL-CM5A-LR Facilitation + Tariff 2.52% 1.96% 69.11 -11.43% 
RCP8.5 MIROC Facilitation + Tariff 1.55% 1.17% 71.06 -11.85% 
RCP8.5 NorESM1-M Facilitation + Tariff 2.15% 1.56% 75.34 -11.95% 
RCP8.5 HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 2.70% 2.36% 68.54 -10.96% 
RCP8.5 wo HadGEM2-ES Facilitation + Tariff 2.35% 1.60% 53.64 -8.72% 





Supplementary Table 3 | Impact of crop yields and trade costs on risk of hunger and food availability by region. 
Results from OLS regression of the impact of crop yield change (1), trade costs (2), and both (3) on food availability 
and risk of hunger including regional interaction effects. Regression models and sample are described in Method.   
  Population at risk of hunger (million) Food availability (kcal/cap/day) 





CSI -0.56 *   -0.37  223.36 ***   233.73 *** 
 (0.31)    (0.34)  (32.47)    (40.29)  
EAS -10.74     -12.78 *** 230.18     267.68 *** 
 (9.43)    (4.18)  (175.86)    (69.10)  
LAC -6.52 ***   -3.24 *** 355.64 ***   283.90 *** 
 (1.90)    (1.24)  (76.29)    (63.92)  
MNA -0.20     1.76  175.42     137.27 *** 
 (7.29)    (2.87)  (139.37)    (51.39)  
OCE -0.19     -0.27  214.93     192.17  
 (0.15)    (0.31)  (161.74)    (291.50)  
SAS -81.21 ***   -82.83 *** 485.73 ***   475.97 *** 
 (16.18)    (21.66)  (73.48)    (93.33)  
SEA -10.94 **   -11.21 * 372.98 ***   383.02 *** 
 (5.42)    (5.85)  (116.26)    (121.74)  
SSA -105.86 ***   -29.70  928.48 **   317.41  
 (38.34)    (22.43)  (365.54)    (254.20)  
USA -0.07 ***   -0.06  156.78 ***   136.54 * 






CSI   0.49 *** 0.48 ***   -31.78 *** -28.47 * 
   (0.09)  (0.12)    (11.85)  (14.25)  
EAS   6.99 *** 6.61 ***   -137.53 *** -132.81 *** 
   (0.46)  (0.45)    (8.38)  (7.41)  
LAC   1.16 *** 1.07 ***   -21.60 *** -17.53 * 
   (0.20)  (0.18)    (7.52)  (7.94)  
MNA   11.36 *** 11.36 ***   -233.76 *** -231.44 *** 
   (0.47)  (0.55)    (11.98)  (10.97)  
OCE   -0.16 *** -0.17 ***   172.75 *** 174.33 *** 
   (0.03)  (0.05)    (31.88)  (51.23)  
SAS   5.42 *** 5.39 *   -27.80 *** -32.17 * 
   (2.03)  (3.02)    (10.20)  (15.00)  
SEA   -0.11   0.00    15.28   11.11  
   (0.53)  (0.63)    (12.96)  (14.33)  
SSA   26.18 *** 24.29 ***   -257.76 *** -248.05 *** 
   (2.56)  (2.41)    (15.77)  (16.51)  
USA   0.03 *** 0.03 ***   -67.11 *** -58.26 *** 





CSI     -0.19      112.59 *** 
     (0.33)      (34.44)  
EAS     -10.56      140.65  
     (7.95)      (91.48)  
LAC     8.32      -201.69  
     (5.93)      (216.83)  
MNA     3.24      -81.95  
     (3.19)      (72.73)  
OCE     -0.04      180.52  
     (0.28)      (237.69)  
SAS     -2.18      -33.26  
     (26.74)      (104.01)  
SEA     1.47      -55.54  
     (6.32)      (120.10)  
SSA     -41.85      -15.56  
     (29.88)      (186.45)  
USA     -0.01      14.40  
          (0.05)           (79.25)   
Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in brackets. EUR and CAN are not included as zero 
hunger. N = 450. Adjusted R squared is 0.999 for food availability (1) - (3) and 0.947 (1), 0.961 (2) and 0.976 (3) for hunger regressions. 
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Supplementary Table 4 | Aggregate regions, GLOBIOM regions and countries.  
Aggregate 
Region 
GLOBIOM Region Country 
CAN Canada Canada 
CSI Former USSR Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaidjan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
EAS China People's Republic of China, Hong Kong  
Japan Japan  
South Korea Korea 
EUR EU Baltic Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  
EU Central East Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia  
EU Mid-West Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands  
EU North Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom  
EU South Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain  
Rest of Central Eastern Europe (RCEU) Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia  
Rest of Western Europe (ROWE) Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Greenland 
LAC Brazil Brazil  
Mexico Mexico  
Central America (RCAM) Bahamas, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Trinidad and Tobago  
South America (RSAM) Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela  
MNA Middle East and North Africa Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen  
Turkey Turkey 
OCE ANZ Australia, New Zealand  
Pacific Islands Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
SAS India India   
Rest of South Asia (RSAS) Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka 
SEA South East Asia – other Pacific Asia 
(RSEA_OPA) 
Brunei Daressalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, East Timor  
South East Asia – (ex-)planned 
economies (RSEA_PAC) 
Cambodia, DPR of Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Viet Nam 
SSA Congo Basin Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon  
Eastern Africa Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda  
South Africa South Africa  
Southern Africa Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Reunion, 
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe  
Western Africa and Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo 
USA USA Region United States, Puerto Rico  
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Supplementary Table 5 | Descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables (at regional level). The 
sample is composed of observations for the 11 regions for five trade scenarios (Baseline, pre-Doha tariffs, 
Facilitation, Tariff elimination, and Facilitation + Tariff elimination) and 10 climate change scenarios (N = 550).  
 Min Average Max 
Population at risk of hunger (million) 0.00 12.04 63.06 
Food availability (kcal/cap/day) 2518 3074 3510 
Crop yield (difference with NoCC) -38% -5% +35% 
Trade costs (US$/106 kcal) 17.91 73.93 225.66 
 
Supplementary Table 6 | Average ad valorem tariffs on GLOBIOM agricultural goods in 2001 and 2010. Tariff rates 
from MAcMap-HS6 database 2001 and 2010 with weighted average by macro-region and product based on MAcMap 
reference group weights1,2. Specific tariffs are converted to ad valorem equivalent with MAcMap unit values. 
REGION 
All agricultural goods 
2001 2010 
import export import export 
CAN 16.63% 7.73% 26.86% 11.41% 
CSI 14.02% 12.41% 12.16% 15.21% 
EAS 39.15% 22.91% 27.51% 14.12% 
EUR 14.10% 14.23% 9.49% 12.65% 
LAC 19.96% 19.09% 14.28% 14.87% 
MNA 19.68% 21.00% 18.54% 19.31% 
OCE 1.89% 30.55% 1.97% 25.04% 
SAS 47.21% 27.98% 31.45% 21.70% 
SEA 9.63% 21.49% 4.32% 16.51% 
SSA 21.98% 10.40% 14.70% 7.86% 
USA 4.45% 20.39% 4.79% 15.56% 
 Wheat 
 2001 2010 
REGION import export import export 
CAN 1.59% 14.06% 0.00% 20.42% 
CSI 10.43% 19.41% 5.41% 28.01% 
EAS 28.70% 22.85% 63.16% 10.31% 
EUR 12.37% 17.00% 7.95% 17.53% 
LAC 9.78% 12.36% 5.29% 26.38% 
MNA 16.60% 14.96% 17.84% 21.10% 
OCE 0.03% 16.32% 0.03% 20.70% 
SAS 67.42% 15.08% 25.60% 17.92% 
SEA 7.77% 25.88% 2.52% 19.15% 
SSA 11.66% 16.09% 5.73% 18.08% 





Supplementary Table 6 continued. 
 Corn 
 2001 2010 
REGION import export import export 
CAN 0.00% 17.24% 0.00% 24.83% 
CSI 8.87% 21.54% 2.14% 33.52% 
EAS 67.84% 30.98% 82.49% 18.45% 
EUR 19.39% 20.36% 1.82% 19.35% 
LAC 35.90% 25.38% 5.43% 28.14% 
MNA 25.96% 13.30% 29.86% 12.47% 
OCE 0.05% 26.33% 0.13% 18.42% 
SAS 41.65% 11.48% 9.46% 18.49% 
SEA 17.86% 27.34% 4.48% 17.97% 
SSA 27.80% 28.40% 7.37% 11.43% 
USA 1.06% 30.09% 0.32% 23.52% 
 Rice 
 2001 2010 
REGION import export import export 
CAN 0.00% 100.96% 0.00% 30.71% 
CSI 8.95% 31.17% 14.60% 34.24% 
EAS 362.15% 52.40% 116.56% 29.45% 
EUR 71.19% 81.67% 16.70% 27.32% 
LAC 21.48% 37.22% 13.67% 33.46% 
MNA 18.51% 34.70% 13.60% 35.93% 
OCE 0.00% 74.20% 0.32% 23.82% 
SAS 56.15% 60.86% 25.84% 30.20% 
SEA 14.76% 89.21% 21.75% 26.92% 
SSA 28.34% 36.85% 10.80% 20.21% 
USA 4.15% 70.13% 2.17% 29.06% 
 Soya 
 2001 2010 
REGION import export import export 
CAN 0.00% 20.57% 0.00% 17.00% 
CSI 2.87% 28.40% 0.13% 10.18% 
EAS 130.66% 18.22% 17.99% 20.27% 
EUR 1.90% 20.67% 0.87% 16.13% 
LAC 3.83% 25.52% 3.66% 7.61% 
MNA 3.79% 21.88% 3.40% 3.18% 
OCE 0.03% 22.12% 0.40% 17.66% 
SAS 27.42% 18.87% 26.82% 15.71% 
SEA 6.01% 33.85% 1.51% 3.71% 
SSA 3.43% 11.53% 6.78% 9.08% 
USA 0.00% 25.27% 0.00% 6.52% 
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Supplementary Table 7 | Average total trade cost (USD/ton) on agricultural trade for each region in 2000 and 
2010, and in 2050 across trade scenarios. The aggregation is described in Method. 
Trade scenario Region Tariff cost Transport cost Trade expansion cost1 Total trade cost 
2000 – Baseline trade 
 
CAN 37 248 / 285 
CSI 35 389 / 424 
EAS 185 721 / 906 
EUR 44 353 / 398 
LAC 37 261 / 298 
MNA 33 272 / 305 
OCE 126 812 / 937 
SAS 173 211 / 384 
SEA 89 581 / 670 
SSA 35 494 / 530 
USA 57 283 / 339 
2010 – Baseline trade CAN 25 215 28 268 
CSI 19 314 33 365 
EAS 219 499 129 846 
EUR 20 328 34 382 
LAC 29 250 29 308 
MNA 24 243 27 294 
OCE 120 508 147 775 
SAS 117 184 53 354 
SEA 177 560 74 811 
SSA 22 412 46 480 
USA 32 236 25 293 
2050 – Baseline trade CAN 20 139 6 165 
CSI 12 188 9 209 
EAS 61 107 11 179 
EUR 17 163 20 200 
LAC 14 147 11 171 
MNA 18 143 38 199 
OCE 256 117 58 431 
SAS 62 75 18 155 
SEA 38 126 11 175 
SSA 18 86 16 121 
USA 24 92 18 135 
2050 – Pre-Doha  
tariff levels 
CAN 8 142 8 158 
CSI 18 262 8 288 
EAS 98 267 6 371 
EUR 20 228 24 272 
LAC 23 186 9 218 
MNA 24 181 53 258 
OCE 54 294 48 397 
SAS 189 130 25 343 
SEA 103 339 16 458 
SSA 23 206 19 249 




Supplementary Table 7 continued. 
Trade scenario Region Tariff cost Transport cost Trade expansion cost1 Total trade cost 
2050 – Trade 
facilitation 
CAN 27 125 7 160 
CSI 12 111 2 125 
EAS 62 76 1 139 
EUR 23 90 1 115 
LAC 18 106 3 127 
MNA 26 94 5 125 
OCE 231 71 9 311 
SAS 48 71 2 121 
SEA 36 99 2 137 
SSA 42 108 4 154 
USA 36 79 3 118 
2050 – Tariff  
elimination 
CAN 0 131 15 146 
CSI 0 144 21 164 
EAS 0 68 15 83 
EUR 0 100 34 135 
LAC 0 101 16 117 
MNA 0 104 36 140 
OCE 0 96 48 143 
SAS 0 64 19 83 
SEA 0 103 16 119 
SSA 0 79 26 105 
USA 0 76 21 97 
2050 – Trade  
facilitation +  
Tariff elimination 
CAN 0 97 5 102 
CSI 0 64 24 88 
EAS 0 64 5 69 
EUR 0 71 20 91 
LAC 0 67 3 70 
MNA 0 71 6 78 
OCE 0 88 24 112 
SAS 0 52 3 55 
SEA 0 84 3 86 
SSA 0 99 4 103 
USA 0 49 3 52 
 1 The trade expansion cost reflects the cost of infrastructure and capacity constraints in the transport sector and is 
reset to zero after a decade if the traded quantity does not increase anymore. It is not present in the base year 2000.   
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Supplementary Table 8 | Corn trade pattern in response to climate change (RCP8.5 scenarios under Baseline trade) 
at macro-region level. Bilateral trade flows among 30 sub-regions are aggregated to reflect inter-regional trade 
among macro-regions and the magnitude of intra-regional trade. No climate change gives the trade volume (1000 
ton) in the SSP2 baseline. Min and max CC impact give the minimum and maximum trade change (%) that occurs 
across RCP8.5 scenarios. Min and max CC new trade give the minimum and maximum trade volume (1000 ton) across 
RCP8.5 scenarios that is new compared to the SSP2 baseline.  
Exporter 
 Importer 
CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
CAN 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min CC impact (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max CC impact (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min CC new trade 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max CC new trade 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSI 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 37 0 1393 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 221% 0% 106% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EAS 
 
No climate change 0 0 5357 0 0 0 0 0 8580 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -8% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 113% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EUR 
 
No climate change 0 0 2407 25938 0 2662 0 0 1773 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -25% -15% 0% 18% 0% 0% -4% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 85% 13% 0% 127% 0% 0% 114% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 573 660 0 0 1522 0 0 0 0 0 
LAC 
 
No climate change 13643 0 0 10112 52812 7945 0 14776 4147 17419 0 
Min trade growth -71% 0% 0% 1% -2% 5% 0% -40% -64% -37% 0% 
Max trade growth -41% 0% 0% 44% 8% 114% 0% 222% 72% 4% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 2069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 2151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MNA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 14659 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -59% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% -10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 336 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 798 0 0 0 0 0 
OCE 
 
No climate change 0 0 677 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 130 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 221 0 0 
SAS 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8393 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 126% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEA 
 
No climate change 0 0 12015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 542 0 0 





Supplementary Table 8 continued. 
Exporter 
 Importer 
CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
SSA 
 
No climate change 0 0 21455 0 2548 13936 0 0 2033 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -49% 0% -84% -93% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 8% 0% 49% -1% 0% 0% 169% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 517 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 6131 1437 14442 491 97388 0 4382 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -99% 4% -15% 0% -88% 0% -75% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 90% 738% 35% 132% 36% 0% 107% 0% 
Min new trade 5669 0 10516 0 0 0 0 0 91 0 0 




Supplementary Table 9 | Rice trade pattern in response to climate change (RCP8.5 scenarios under Baseline trade) 
at macro-region level. Bilateral trade flows among 30 sub-regions are aggregated to reflect inter-regional trade 
among macro-regions and the magnitude of intra-regional trade. No climate change gives the trade volume (1000 
ton) in the SSP2 baseline. Min and max CC impact give the minimum and maximum trade change (%) that occurs 
across RCP8.5 scenarios. Min and max CC new trade give the minimum and maximum trade volume (1000 ton) across 
RCP8.5 scenarios that is new compared to the SSP2 baseline. 
Exporter 
 Importer 
CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
EAS 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 170 33 0 0 630 71663 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% -6% -6% 0% 0% 0% -3% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 11% 0% 0% 170% 1% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EUR 
 
No climate change 619 0 0 316 5554 17432 0 0 0 2304 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -75% -70% -39% 0% 0% 0% -16% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% -6% 5% 2% 0% 0% 0% 57% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
LAC 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 2805 6730 743 0 0 0 834 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 2% -8% -15% 0% 0% 0% -3% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 104% 24% 73% 0% 0% 0% 125% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 296 0 0 0 0 0 640 0 
MNA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 1255 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OCE 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 290 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SAS 
 
No climate change 0 88 0 1525 0 1957 175 0 9038 1098 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -7% 0% -97% -59% 0% -18% -79% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 5% 111% 0% 287% 4% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEA 
 
No climate change 0 0 78592 939 0 0 294 54530 0 414 3097 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -3% -41% 0% 0% -49% -23% 0% -21% -60% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 1% 6% 0% 0% 18% 12% 0% 6% 486% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 104 0 84 0 0 0 0 0 
SSA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 119 58 0 0 0 0 58 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -15% -17% 0% 0% 0% 0% -17% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Supplementary Table 9 continued. 
Exporter 
 Importer 
 CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
USA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 24310 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% -49% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% -5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 





Supplementary Table 10 | Wheat trade pattern in response to climate change (RCP8.5 scenarios under Baseline 
trade) at macro-region level. Bilateral trade flows among 30 sub-regions are aggregated to reflect inter-regional 
trade among macro-regions and the magnitude of intra-regional trade. No climate change gives the trade volume 
(1000 ton) in the SSP2 baseline. Min and max CC impact give the minimum and maximum trade change (%) that 
occurs across RCP8.5 scenarios. Min and max CC new trade give the minimum and maximum trade volume (1000 
ton) across RCP8.5 scenarios that is new compared to the SSP2 baseline. 
Exporter  Importer 
CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
CAN 
 
No climate change 0 0 5961 0 1056 0 0 0 0 2503 8185 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -1% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% -48% 126% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% -48% 262% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSI 
 
No climate change 0 0 1733 4391 0 11553 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -35% -73% 0% -27% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 125% 153% 0% 60% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 5872 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EAS 
 
No climate change 0 0 4600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -47% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EUR 
No climate change 0 360 42 13319 13222 2456 0 0 14637 18336 0 
Min trade growth 0% -68% 438% -45% 66% -4% 0% 0% -2% 12% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 54% 593% 37% 74% 410% 0% 0% 1% 34% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 602 0 0 0 
LAC 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 0 6930 0 515 0 2156 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -17% 0% 1% 0% 3% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 49% 0% 157% 0% 26% 0% 
Min new trade 0 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 75 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
MNA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 18500 0 0 0 0 0 12649 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 58% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 19% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 80% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 42% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 1085 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 1085 0 0 0 1466 0 
OCE 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 0 0 228 59506 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% -11% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 39% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SAS 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5711 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -57% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEA 
 
No climate change 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 63 4 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% -52% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 66% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 125% 12% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





Supplementary Table 10 continued. 
Exporter 
 Importer 
 CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
SSA 
 
No climate change 0 2 3 4 1 1 8 1 0 4 0 
Min trade growth 0% -58% -2% -80% -26% 43% -8% 51% 0% -28% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 13% 51% 96% 68% 51% 59% 480% 0% 1394% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 58 0 
USA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21859 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -99% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -36% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Supplementary Table 11 | Soya trade pattern in response to climate change (RCP8.5 scenarios under Baseline 
trade) at macro-region level. Bilateral trade flows among 30 sub-regions are aggregated to reflect inter-regional 
trade among macro-regions and the magnitude of intra-regional trade. No climate change gives the trade volume 
(1000 ton) in the SSP2 baseline. Min and max CC impact give the minimum and maximum trade change (%) that 
occurs across RCP8.5 scenarios. Min and max CC new trade give the minimum and maximum trade volume (1000 
ton) across RCP8.5 scenarios that is new compared to the SSP2 baseline. 
Exporter  Importer 
CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
CAN 
 
No climate change 0 0 3994 160 0 0 0 0 437 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -10% -14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 11% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CSI 
 
No climate change 0 0 16418 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EAS 
 
No climate change 0 0 1294 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Max new trade 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
EUR 
 
No climate change 0 10313 6171 8137 1199 908 910 0 7088 2999 0 
Min trade growth 0% 3% -73% 26% -7% 0% -40% 0% 16% -1% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 10% -63% 64% 208% 19% 21% 0% 60% 23% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 465 3 0 0 0 0 145 0 
LAC 
 
No climate change 5375 1029 50840 59989 22140 23805 217 18666 14279 835 0 
Min trade growth -29% -55% 8% -7% -22% -5% -8% 46% 3% -30% 0% 
Max trade growth 67% 12% 13% 13% 4% 9% 13% 89% 26% -1% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 249 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 382 0 1 0 1 1327 0 2 0 
MNA 
 
No climate change 0 4033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 
Min trade growth 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 478% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1256% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 276 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 593 0 0 0 
OCE 
 
No climate change 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 675 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 28% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 0 0 0 
SAS 
No climate change 0 0 173 0 1 0 0 9068 4110 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -10% 0% -38% 0% 0% -35% -23% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 206% 0% 117% 0% 0% -19% 8% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SEA 
 
No climate change 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 1546 0 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -11% 0% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 297% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 26% 0% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





Supplementary Table 11 continued. 
Exporter 
 Importer 
 CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA OCE SAS SEA SSA USA 
SSA 
 
No climate change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 546 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -9% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 54% 0% 
Min new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max new trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 
 
No climate change 0 0 607 1235 5111 284 0 1333 7385 279 0 
Min trade growth 0% 0% -61% -58% -40% 1162% 0% -67% -61% 102% 0% 
Max trade growth 0% 0% 3% 28% 8% 1162% 0% 89% 26% 102% 0% 
Min new trade 1983 0 0 0 0 3374 472 0 0 188 0 
Max new trade 1983 0 0 340 0 3374 472 0 264 188 0 
 
Supplementary Table 22 | Technology-induced exogenous crop yield growth rates between 2000 and 2050 
under SSP2.  
Region All crops Corn Rice Soya Wheat 
USA 34% 39% 42% 35% 18% 
CAN 36% 45% 0% 13% 43% 
EUR 44% 66% 17% 37% 39% 
CSI 110% 123% 128% 87% 111% 
EAS 45% 49% 32% 36% 68% 
SEA 67% 140% 60% 64% 166% 
SAS 93% 137% 117% 98% 86% 
MNA 77% 124% 66% 56% 75% 
SSA 114% 185% 108% 154% 56% 
LAC 86% 172% 96% 63% 106% 








Contribution to existing literature 
To determine whether international trade can act as an adaptation mechanism to climate change, global 
simulation studies assess whether for a particular indicator, the outcome under climate change is worse 
under a restricted trade setting or better under a liberalized trade setting. Supplementary Table 13 
presents an overview of the trade and climate change scenarios assessed in recent literature. Most studies 
focus on either trade liberalization or trade restriction, or do not compare the impact of trade under 
climate change to the impact of trade under current climate. By analyzing a comprehensive set of both 
trade and climate change scenarios, this paper intends to contribute to this research gap and investigates 
whether the impact of trade becomes larger under climate change.  
Supplementary Fig. 5 compares the results in this paper to previous simulation studies. It reveals that 
there is an agreement on the direction of the impact of trade: trade restriction worsens the adverse 
impact of climate change on agricultural GDP, prices or risk of hunger, while trade integration alleviates 
it. It further shows that our scenarios identify a wider range of impacts compared to previous literature. 
For example, we find that trade restriction increases the adverse impact of climate change on food prices 
by 40% to 90%, compared to 63% in Wiebe et al3, or that trade integration reduces the adverse impact of 




Supplementary Table 13 | Comparison of global simulation studies3–9 on climate change adaptation in the agricultural sector through international trade. Overview of scenarios 
assessed: restricted (T_FIX) or liberalized (T_LIB) trade, under current climate (No CC) or climate change (CC).  
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Supplementary Fig. 5 | Comparison of literature on climate change adaptation in agricultural sector through international trade: impact of restricted (T_FIX) or liberalized 
(T_LIB) trade compared to baseline trade scenario (T0) under RCP8.5 with (wt) or without (wo) CO2 fertilization. T_FIX vs T0 indicates how restricting trade alters the impact 
climate change (
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝐶 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇_𝐹𝐼𝑋
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝐶 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇0
− 1). T_LIB vs T0 gives the impact of liberalizing or facilitating trade on climate change effects (1 −
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝐶 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐵
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝐶 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇0
). T_FIX vs T_LIB 
compares the impact of restricting trade compared to open trade under climate change (1 −
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝐶 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐵
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝐶 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇_𝐹𝐼𝑋
). For details on the restricted (T_FIX) and liberalized (T_LIB) 
trade scenarios of each paper, see Supplementary Table 13.
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Comparative advantage analysis 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage postulates that a country has a comparative advantage if the 
opportunity cost of producing a certain good in terms of other goods is smaller than it is in other 
countries10. Trade benefits countries when they export goods for which they have a comparative 
advantage through gains in efficiency and consumption possibilities. Less resources are needed for the 
same level of consumption, or equivalently, a higher consumption level can be reached for the same 
amount of resources. Our indicators of comparative advantage are inspired by the application of Ricardo’s 
trade theory to a multi-country multi-good setting by Constinot et al.11. They propose that when trade 
barriers are removed, a country should not produce and export only the goods for which it has a 
comparative advantage, but it should produce and export relatively more of these goods. Using linear 
regression models, we estimate whether trade cost reduction increases the share of production of a crop 
that region represents in total world production of the crop (Fig. 4 in main text), the share of each crop in 
a region’s total crop production (Supplementary Fig. 6), and the share of a region’s production that is 
exported (Supplementary Fig. 7). Production and export effects mostly correspond, but there are some 
cases where reduced trade costs increase export shares without corresponding increases in production 
shares, e.g. corn in CSI and EUR, or wheat in CAN. These specialization indicators take into account 
differences in land productivity, land endowment and competitiveness between crops and regions. 
As a robustness check, we report additional indicators of comparative advantage that are common in the 
literature. The original definition of comparative advantage in the Ricardo trade model states that “A 
country has a comparative advantage in producing a good if the opportunity cost of producing that good 
in terms of other goods is lower in that country than it is in other countries.” (Krugman and Obstfeld10 p. 
14). The assessment of comparative advantages requires tackling the fundamental identification problem 
of unobserved relative productivity differences across countries under complete specialization12. Costinot 
and Donaldson13 demonstrate that the identification problem can be solved in the context of agricultural 
production by using agronomic predictions of crop yields in each country. They define comparative 
advantage in terms of the relative crop yield (productivity 𝐴𝑐𝑓
𝑔
) between two crops (goods 𝑔) and two 








𝑔1 ) for two goods 𝑔1 and 𝑔2, 
then field 𝑓2 has a comparative advantage in good 𝑔2”. We use a similar measure, but perform a cross-
region comparison with for each crop the ratio of yield to the average yield of all other crops 
(Supplementary Fig. 8). A second related indicator is the relative competitiveness across crops and 
regions. GLOBIOM is a perfect competition model implying that producer prices reflect marginal costs. By 
comparing for each region and crop its producer price to the world average price and regional average 
crop price, we assess to what extent a region can produce a certain crop at a lower cost compared to 
other regions and compared to other crops (Supplementary Fig. 9 and 10). Lastly, we report the Balassa 
Index14 of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (Supplementary Fig. 11). RCA compares the export 
performance of a region in a certain crop with the global export performance for that crop. To exclude 
the impact of trade barriers on export performance, we calculate the index based on the trade pattern in 




Supplementary Fig. 6 | Intra-regional specialization in corn, rice, soya and wheat in response to trade cost reduction in 2050. 
a) presents the share in total regional crop production under no climate change in Baseline trade and Facilitation + Tariff 
Elimination. In b) each point shows the estimated impact of a 1% reduction in trade costs for each region on share of regional 
crop production in percentage, with lines denoting the corresponding 95% confidence interval (heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors). Idem for c), except that the outcome variable is the difference in share of regional crop production with the no climate 




Supplementary Fig. 7 | Export orientation of production in corn, rice, soya and wheat in response to trade cost reduction in 
2050. a) presents the share of production exported under no climate change in Baseline trade and Facilitation + Tariff Elimination. 
In b) each point shows the estimated impact of a 1% trade cost reduction for each region on share of production exported in 
percentage, with lines denoting the corresponding 95% confidence interval (heteroskedastic robust standard errors). Idem for c), 
except that the outcome variable is the difference in share of production exported compared to no climate change. Regression 





Supplementary Fig. 8 | Relative competitiveness (across regions) in response to climate change in 2050 under Baseline trade. 
The y axis indicates the producer price relative to the world average producer price for each crop, with values below zero 
indicating an above average competitiveness. Boxplots show the distribution of the relative producer price over the nine climate 
change scenarios (lower and upper hinges corresponding to 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers reflecting values no further than 
1.5*IQR from the hinges, and points showing outliers). Distinction is made between regions that have a deficit production in at 
least 90% of trade and climate change scenario (Always deficit), and regions that do not (Not always deficit). 
 
Supplementary Fig. 9 | Relative competitiveness (across regions and crops) in response to climate change in 2050 under 
Baseline trade. The y-axis indicates for each crop and region the ratio of the crop price to the average price of all other crops. A 
ratio below 1 (below the dotted line) indicates a high competitiveness compared to other crops. Boxplots show the distribution 
of the ratio under the nine climate change scenarios (lower and upper hinges corresponding to 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers 
reflecting values no further than 1.5*IQR from the hinge, and points outliers). Distinction is made between regions that have a 





Supplementary Fig. 10 | Relative yield of corn, rice, soya and wheat in response to climate change in 2050 under Baseline 
trade. The y-axis indicates for each crop the ratio of yield to the average yield of all other crops. A ratio larger than 1 (above the 
dotted line) indicates a low opportunity cost in terms of land. Boxplots show the distribution under the nine climate change 
scenarios (lower and upper hinges corresponding to 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers reflecting values no further than 1.5*IQR 
from the hinge, and points outliers). Distinction is made between regions that have a deficit production in at least 90% of climate 
change and trade scenario (Always deficit), and regions who do not (Not always deficit). 
 
Supplementary Fig. 11 | Impact of climate change on Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Balassa Index in 2050 under 
Facilitation + Tariff elimination. The y-axis indicates for each crop the share of a region’s exports in a region’s total crop export 
relative to the share of the global exports in global total crop exports14. A value above one indicates a revealed comparative 
advantage. Boxplots show the distribution under the nine climate change scenarios (lower and upper hinges corresponding to 
25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers reflecting values no further than 1.5*IQR from the hinge, and points outliers). Regions with 
deficit production in more than 10% of climate change and trade scenarios are excluded.  
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CO2 fertilization sensitivity analysis  
Model intercomparison studies show that the representation of the CO2 fertilization effect is one of the 
key factors causing uncertainty in crop yield projections under climate change15,16. The fertilization effect 
depends on nutrient and water availability, and is heterogeneous across crops and regions16–18. Compared 
to other crop models, EPIC is on the conservative side in terms of the positive impact of CO2 fertilization15. 
To check the sensitivity of our results to the impact of CO2 fertilization on crop yields, we ran the full 
spectrum of RCP scenarios (RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, RCP8.5) with and without CO2 fertilization. For the full 
spectrum, we have, however, only crop projections available from EPIC for four crops (corn, soya, wheat 
and rice) based on HadGEM2-ES climate change projections. The limited availability of non-CO2 sensitivity 
runs is related to priorities set in the ISIMIP Fast Track protocol (see Method). To model climate change 
shifts for all crops in GLOBIOM, we map the crop yield impacts from the four crops to the other crops in a 
similar way as the mapping used by Müller and Robertson19 for DSSAT (Supplementary Table 14).  
Supplementary Table 14| Mapping of corn, wheat, rice and soya yield simulations from EPIC to all crops in GLOBIOM for the 
CO2 sensitivity analysis (RCP2.6 – RCP8.5: with or without CO2 fertilization)1. 
GLOBIOM crop Mapping   
C3 crops (cassava, groundnuts, rapeseed, 
sunflower, palm, chickpeas, cotton, potatoes, 
sweet potatoes, beans) 
C3 crops are represented by the average climate 
impact on the three C3 crops that are directly 
simulated (wheat, rice and soybean)2 
Corn Corn yield is directly simulated  
Millet, sorghum Millet and sorghum are represented by modified 
corn yield simulations: only half of the negative 
effects are applied due to better drought 
tolerance 
Rice Rice yield is directly simulated 
Soybean Soybean yield is directly simulated 
Sugarcane Sugarcane yield is represented by corn yield 
simulations 
Wheat Wheat yield is directly simulated 
Other grains (barley)  Barley is represented by modified wheat yield 
simulations: only half of the negative effects are 
applied due to better drought tolerance 
1The sensitivity analysis to CO2 fertilization is limited to crop impacts. For grassland, we use the EPIC yield shifters 
for each RCP including CO2 fertilization. 2We compute the average of wheat, rice and soybean impacts weighted by 
base year area x yield.  
Supplementary Fig. 12 shows the average crop yield impacts under the different RCPs, with and without 
the effect of CO2 fertilization. The simulated crop yield under each RCP is lower when CO2 fertilization is 
not taken into account. Average crop yields in this scenario set are in most regions larger than the 
simulations in the paper (Supplementary Table 15). This is a consequence of the bias that is introduced by 
mapping the impacts of corn, wheat, soya and rice to the other crops compared to the scenario set in the 
paper where we use direct simulations from EPIC for all crops.  
Supplementary Fig. 13 plots the global risk of hunger under the alternative set of climate change scenarios. 
In the Baseline trade scenario, the risk of hunger is always higher without than with CO2 fertilization. The 
hunger projections under the scenarios that we miss in the main scenario set (RCP2.6 – RCP6 without CO2) 
lie between the lowest (RCP2.6 with CO2) and highest climate change impact (RCP8.5 without CO2). This 
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shows that we capture the full range of climate change impacts in our main scenario set. Note that the 
increase in risk of hunger under these climate change scenarios is lower than in the original runs (Fig. 1 in 
main text). This is related to the bias introduced by the mapping, as also reflected in the lower average 
crop yield impacts in the simulations based on the 4 priority crops (Supplementary Table 15). As in the 
original run, the risk of hunger in RCP4.5 is slightly higher than in RCP6. In 2050 the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 and likely range of global mean temperature increase are slightly higher under 
RCP4.5 than under RCP6, while by the end of the century the situation is reversed20,21. The effect of the 
trade scenarios is the same as in the original run: Fixed imports and pre-Doha tariffs increase hunger, while 
Tariff elimination, Facilitation and the combined scenario decrease hunger. Also the regional results from 
the main scenario set (Extended Data Fig. 7) are robust under the alternative set of climate change 
scenarios (Supplementary Fig. 14). SAS and SSA face the most severe hunger risks. SSA, EAS and MNA 
benefit the most from trade liberalization and facilitation in terms of hunger reduction, while in SEA and 
SAS tariff elimination has adverse impacts in some climate change scenarios.  
We also analyze the relation between hunger, trade costs and crop yields based on the alternative set of 
climate change scenarios (Supplementary Table 16). The findings are similar to the results in main text 
(Table 1): reducing trade costs lowers the risk of hunger and lower crop yields increases the risk of hunger. 
When excluding regions that experience negative impacts in some trade scenarios (SAS, SEA), we find, 
however, no significant negative interaction effect. This could be related to the overall lower hunger 
impacts of the alternative climate change scenario set.  
Lastly, to assess the sensitivity of our comparative advantage results to CO2 fertilization, we cannot use 
the alternative set of climate change scenarios because comparative advantage is determined by relative 
crop yield impacts. The mapping used to extrapolate impacts from the 4 crops to other crops implies that 
crop impacts are by construction correlated and that an analysis of comparative advantage based on these 
simulations would thus be biased. We therefore use our original scenario set and compare our indicator 
of comparative advantage between RCP8.5 with and without CO2 fertilization. Supplementary Fig. 15 
illustrates that the changes in share of global production for each crop are similar in the RCP8.5 scenario 
with and without CO2 fertilization. This suggests that the conclusion on the impact of climate change on 





Supplementary Fig. 12 | Biophysical impact of climate change on average crop yield in each region by 2050 as projected by the 
EPIC crop model. Yields in ton dry matter per ha. The x-axis indicates the average crop yield under no climate change and y-axis 
the average crop yield under climate change for different RCPs with and without considering the CO2 fertilization effect. Points 
above the black line indicate an increase in crop yield, points below a decrease in crop yield. Direct simulations for corn, wheat, 




Supplementary Table 15 | Comparison of average crop yield (dm ton/ha) in each region based on direct EPIC 
simulations on all crops (1) and EPIC simulations based on 4 major crops (2), with (wt) and without (wo) the effect of 
CO2 fertilization. Climate projections from HadGEM2-ES. 
  CAN CSI EAS EUR LAC MNA 
Climate scenario  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (2)  
RCP2.6 wt CO2 2.93 2.98 3.29 3.34 5.34 5.35 5.92 5.91 6.20 6.52 3.48 3.61 
RCP4.5 wt CO2 2.71 2.77 3.24 3.24 5.20 5.23 5.88 5.86 6.12 6.52 3.42 3.56 
RCP6.0 wt CO2 3.32 3.33 3.42 3.46 5.20 5.23 6.01 5.94 6.20 6.55 3.60 3.74 
RCP8.5 wt CO2 2.80 2.84 3.29 3.33 5.06 5.10 6.09 6.05 6.02 6.55 3.56 3.73 
RCP8.5 wo CO2 2.35 2.44 2.75 2.85 4.51 4.52 5.46 5.61 5.64 6.22 3.12 3.32 
  OCE SAS SEA SSA USA   
Climate scenario  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)    
RCP2.6 wt CO2 3.26 3.35 4.22 4.33 4.28 4.47 2.26 2.34 4.81 4.81   
RCP4.5 wt CO2 3.15 3.25 3.90 4.11 4.28 4.50 2.19 2.31 4.28 4.27   
RCP6.0 wt CO2 3.23 3.30 4.01 4.19 4.28 4.49 2.18 2.28 5.22 5.21   
RCP8.5 wt CO2 3.13 3.26 3.68 3.94 4.08 4.36 2.15 2.29 3.31 3.31   




Supplementary Fig. 13 | Global population at risk of hunger (million) in 2050 across RCPs from HadGEM2-ES and trade 




Supplementary Fig. 14 | Population at risk of hunger (million) in 2050 across RCPs from HadGEM2-ES and trade scenarios in 




Supplementary Table 16 | Results from OLS estimation of the impact of crop yields, trade costs and their interaction on 
population at risk of hunger and food availability. Observations are GLOBIOM output for the 11 world regions under five 
different trade scenarios (Baseline, pre-Doha tariffs, Facilitation, Tariff elimination, and Facilitation + Tariff elimination) and the 
set of 9 alternative climate change scenarios in 2050 (No CC, RCP2.6 – RCP8.5: with and without CO2 fertilization effect projected 
by EPIC & HadGEM2-ES).  
  Population at risk of hunger (million) Food availability (kcal/cap/day) 
  (1) All regions 
(2) without SAS 
and SEA 
(1) All regions 
(2) without SAS 
and SEA 
Crop yield  
(% change) 
-8.35 *** -2.85  241.00 *** 210.00 *** 
(2.99)  (2.22)  (39.30)  (43.40)  
Trade cost (log of 
US$/106 kcal) 
4.22 *** 4.62 *** -42.90 *** -63.90 *** 
(0.53)  (0.60)  (6.56)  (9.68)  
Crop yield x Trade 
cost  
0.01  -5.65  215.00 *** 271.00 *** 
(5.32)  (4.17)  (74.00)  (85.60)  
Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Regional fixed effects included. Heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors in brackets. N = 495 for (1) and 405 for (2). Adjusted R squared is 0.926 (1) and 0.948 (2) for hunger regressions 
and 0.955 (1) and 0.920 (2) for food availability regressions.  
 
 
Supplementary Fig. 15 | Impact of trade liberalization and trade facilitation on regions’ share of global production of corn, rice, 
soya and wheat under no climate change (No CC), RCP8.5 with CO2 fertilization and RCP8.5 without CO2 fertilization. Direct 
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